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Background: Early detection of an impending flood and the availability of countermeasures to deal with it
can significantly reduce its health impacts. In developing countries like India, public primary health care
facilities are frontline organizations that deal with disasters particularly in rural settings. For developing
robust counter reacting systems evaluating preparedness capacities within existing systems becomes necessary.
Objective: The objective of the study is to assess the functional capacity of the primary health care system in
Jagatsinghpur district of rural Orissa in India to respond to the devastating flood of September 2008.
Methods: An onsite survey was conducted in all 29 primary and secondary facilities in five rural blocks
(administrative units) of Jagatsinghpur district in Orissa state. A pre-tested structured questionnaire was
administered face to face in the facilities. The data was entered, processed and analyzed using STATA
†
10.
Results: Data from our primary survey clearly shows that the healthcare facilities are ill prepared to handle
the flood despite being faced by them annually. Basic utilities like electricity backup and essential medical
supplies are lacking during floods. Lack of human resources along with missing standard operating
procedures; pre-identified communication and incident command systems; effective leadership; and weak
financial structures are the main hindering factors in mounting an adequate response to the floods.
Conclusion: The 2008 flood challenged the primary curative and preventive health care services in
Jagatsinghpur. Simple steps like developing facility specific preparedness plans which detail out standard
operating procedures during floods and identify clear lines of command will go a long way in strengthening
the response to future floods. Performance critiques provided by the grass roots workers, like this one, should
be used for institutional learning and effective preparedness planning. Additionally each facility should
maintain contingency funds for emergency response along with local vendor agreements to ensure stock
supplies during floods. The facilities should ensure that baseline public health standards for health care
delivery identified by the Government are met in non-flood periods in order to improve the response during
floods. Building strong public primary health care systems is a development challenge. The recovery phases of
disasters should be seen as an opportunity to expand and improve services and facilities.
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O
ver 216 hydrological disasters (85.2% floods)
were reported in 2010 across the world with
about 189 million victims. The occurrence of
these disasters increased by 20% over 2009 and was above
the annual average of 192 for the last decade (1).
Furthermore, the intensity of flooding is expected to
rise with the changes in climate (2, 3). The health impacts
of floods are most pronounced in developing countries,
where weak health care systems are already overbur-
dened. The impacts on the health care systems are
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structural damage to health facilities resulting in primary
failures and secondary failures that result mainly from
exhaustion of supplies and staff burn outs (4, 5). Systemic
failures irrespective of the type prevent the much required
early response.
Patients with limited options in their choice of health
care are at greater risk to suffer worsened health impacts
(6). When public hospitals are impacted the poor are
more likely to be disproportionally affected. Private
health care facilities have the option to close shop adding
to the burden on public facilities which are seldom in a
position to sustain (7). In low and middle income
countries like India, public primary health care facilities
are frontline organizations that deal with disasters
particularly in rural settings (8, 9). During flooding, the
increased frequency of diseases, injured, together with
new patients seeking care, compounded by minimal
resource availability, significantly reduces the ability of
the system to respond adequately (10, 11).
Preparedness holds the key. Early detection of an
impending flood and the availability of countermeasures
within health systems to deal with it can significantly
reduce the health impacts on a population (12). However,
health systems are labour intensive and require qualified
and experienced staff to function well. In order to
develop robust counter reacting systems, evaluating
preparedness capacities within existing systems becomes
necessary (3). Initial assessments should focus on identi-
fying vulnerable facilities and populations; anticipate
needs; and investigate the average disruption time in
order to prepare for the next event (13).
Surge capacity is defined as ‘the ability to rapidly meet
increased demand for medical care and absorb the
increase in number of patients. It consists of three
essential components namely staff, supplies, and struc-
ture’ (14, 15). Each disaster event may or may not require
surge. There are no standardized measures for surge
capacity and quantifying and standardizing surge in these
conditions is a complex process. Each facility is indepen-
dent and should assess its own vulnerabilities and plan
realistically according to its unique needs (16, 17).
The impacts of floods on the use of primary and
secondary health care services have not been extensively
investigated (2). Over 62% of the 547 publications in the
US from 1997 to 2008 in the field of emergency
preparedness in public health systems were commentaries
or reviews rather than primary research (18). Further-
more, very little has been said about internal disasters in
facilities and how they cope with these situations (19).
Often planning assumptions in health care facilities of
most low and middle income countries including India,
are based on conventional wisdom than evidence (8).
The WHO advocates strengthening of the six building
blocks of the health system namely service delivery;
health workforce; information; medical products, vac-
cines and technologies; financing; and leadership and
governance (stewardship) to improve health outcomes
which also serves as an important point of departure in
creating sustainable health systems to combat disasters
such as floods (20).
The objective of the study is to assess the functional
capacity of the primary health care system in Jagatsingh-
pur district of rural Orissa in India to respond to the
devastating flood of September 2008. The study aims to
serve as a baseline for comparisons to future evaluations.
Methods
Study area
Orissa is situated on the Eastern coast of India along the
Bay of Bengal. Due to its sub-tropical littoral location
and long coastline, the state is prone to post monsoon
flooding, tropical cyclones, and storm surges. The
September 2008 flood was due to heavy rainfall in the
upper as well as lower catchments of the Mahanadi River
System and lasted from the 16th to 21st September 2008.
The magnitude and severity of this event surpassed the
ferocities of 1982 and 2001 floods which were known to
be the worst. As per preliminary report PWD roads were
damaged with over 97 breaches across 1,927.60 km and
956 rural roads measuring 2,925 km were washed away.
Twenty one districts including 8062 villages and over 4.5
million people were affected. Ninety six human lives were
lost and over 213,000 houses were damaged in the state.
In Jagatsinghpur district, with a population of 1,058,894,
all the eight blocks including 188 villages and 147,427
people were severely affected. Over 8,072 houses were
completely damaged in the flood. (21). We conducted the
study in Jagatsinghpur which has been affected by eleven
floods in the last two decades. The five worst affected
blocks (Governmental administrative units) namely Era-
sama, Kujang, Tirtol, Balikuda and Biridi were included
in the study (See Fig. 1).
The Chief District Medical Officer (CDMO) of Jagat-
singhpur district was in-charge of organizing the response
that included setting up  a control room, mobile health
unit, stock indenting, and coordination of the 29 public
health care centres in the district. The CDMO together
with the medical officers, sanitary inspectors and field
health workers were also responsible to monitor, control
and prevent outbreaks. The team faced difficulties with
reaching remote places with relief.
Study design and participants
Public sector health care system in India is organized at
three levels. The general hospital at the district constitutes
the apex of system. The next level is the community
health centre (CHC) a 30 bed hospital covering a
population of 100,000 and serving as the first referral
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(PHC) covering a population of 30,000. Conceptually, the
PHC is the organizational pivot through which the
integrated services are delivered at the community level
to the entire population. The PHCs are expected to
provide out- and in-patient services. However these
centres do not have sophisticated diagnostic equipments
or OT facilities (23). Each PHC has 45 sub-centre’s
attached to them that cover a population of 5,000 and are
expected to provide out-patient services with field services
in the area of community health through Auxiliary Nurse
Midwives (ANMs); multi-purpose health workers
(MPWs) and ASHA (Accredited Social Health
Activists)(24).
A list of all the health centres in the five identified
blocks was procured. A total of 31 health centres were
listed in the five blocks. Of which two were non functional
and therefore excluded. An onsite survey was conducted
in all the 29 public health care facilities (PHC) available
in the study area which was predominantly rural. The
interviewees included 29 chief medical officers. A No
Objection Certificate was obtained from the relevant
government authorities to conduct the study. Informed
consent was obtained from all the participants before
commencing the interviews.
Instruments and data collection
The pre-tested structured questionnaire was administered
face to face. The interviewer visited the assigned centre a
maximum of three times to obtain data. No incentives
were offered for participation. The questionnaire investi-
gated routine workload and services provided at the
facilities; bed capacity; quality of care provided; Health
Information Management systems including routine and
emergency surveillance; functioning of accessory systems
such as electricity, solid waste, and access roads; and
contingency and preparedness activities and plans in
the facility. The time frame of the disaster was set as
before1 month before onset of the flood, during
disasterSeptemberOctober 2008 and after disaster
at the time of interview (15th November18th December
2008). The Voluntary Health Association of India
(VHAI) team who were the official project partners in
India led the study.
Data analysis
Data obtained from the onsite survey was recorded on
the paper based collection forms. The data was entered,
processed and analyzed using STATA
†
10. Descriptive
analyses were tabulated for the survey items.
Results
Health services provision
Health conditions treated
Some of the most prevalent diseases in the areabefore the
flood in 2008 were skin diseases, viral fevers, diarrhea,
common cold and malaria. The frequencies fluctuated
during and after the flood. During the time of the flood
diarrhea, dysentery, conjunctivitis, and viral fever with
Fig. 1. Study site.
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Common cold / viral fevers; malaria; diarrhea; and
chikungunya were some of the most common conditions
after the flood. Conjunctivitis emerged as a major health
care challenge during the flood. Chikungunya which was
not endemic to the district was reported for the first time
following this flood. Injuries emerged as the most
common health conditions treated during the flood.
The most common reasons of injuries were cuts / wounds,
snake bites, and minor accident related injuries. Snake
bites presented as major logistic challenge particularly
with the transport of anti-venom from the district head-
quarter to the facilities (Figs. 2 and 3).
Dysfunction vs. service interruption
Fifteen of the 29 (51.7%) healthcare facilities stated that
services offeredwere not interrupted but they experienced
dysfunction. Of these 22.7% attributed the dysfunction to
the buildings being damaged by flood waters and 77.3%
attributed it, to equipment damage. Referrals both
secondary and tertiary were absent in all the facilities
during the flood period due to the damaged roads (Fig. 4).
Functioning of support systems
Eight facilities (27.5%) reported break down of electricity
supply after the flood and 93% of these facilities did not
have back up supply for total period of breakdown. The
breakdown lasted between 8 and 15 days in three of the
facilities that reported it. All the surveyed facilities stated
that the sewage system was damaged or affected but the
damage did not cause any public health problems.
Similarly all 29 facilities reported that the garbage/solid
waste management system was dysfunctional during the
flood period although it did not cause any public health
problems. Hospital waste disposal, e.g. sharps, syringes,
bio waste etc was a challenge for 16 (55.2%) of the
facilities during the flood.
Communication systems both internal and external
form the backbone of disaster management systems.
About 20 (69%) of the 29 facilities replied that
there was no interruption of the communication systems
within the facility. Over 19 (65.5%) of the responding
facilities said that the road access was disrupted during
the flood.
Ability of the health care system to cope
Only 11 (37.9%) facilities reported that they are able to
fairly handle the flood. The majority rated their perfor-
mance as poor. Pediatric services were the most poorly
equipped to handle the floodwith 22 (76%) of the facilities
rating the current status as poor. The adult medical and
surgical services were rated as poorly equipped by 18
(62.1%) of the respondents. Treatment of chronic condi-
tions like hypertension, diabetes, and stroke, were rated as
poor by 13 (44.8%) of the respondents (Fig. 5).
Vertical programmes like HIV, TB, and immunization
programs fared better and 16 (55.2%) of the facilities
coped fairly in running them. Obstetrics services were in
the best position with 19 (64.5%) facilities stating the
performance as fair. Out patient’s services also appeared
relatively better off to cope with the flood with 17 (58.6%)
rating it fair.
About 24 (83%) of the facilities said that they did not
procure any assistance or coordinate efforts with external
agencies like the national armed forces, local or interna-
tional NGOs, UN agencies etc. Representatives of all 29
facilities thought that there was sufficient supervision of
the staff within the facility for adequate performance
during the flood.
Human resources availability
The mean number of daily in-patients and out-patients
treated in a facility was 1.90 and 67.07 respectively during
the flood period. There is a dearth of all types of health
care personnel particularly lab technicians and nurses
even during non flood periods. There was no change in
the mean number of health staff available and stood
at Nurses (0.64, 0.66); Physicians (1.38, 1.59); Lab
Technicians (0.25, 0.25); Public Health Workers (8.24,
8.38); and Pharmacists (1.07, 1.0) before and during the
Fig. 2. Health conditions treated at the facilities.
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they experienced staff shortage during the time of flood.
Although a majority of the facilities had a license bed
capacity of at least one bed for adult medical and surgical
treatment under the certificate of need, there was no
operational adult medical, surgical or paediatric bed in
any of the facilities visited. The facilities only offered day
care and basic obstetrics and gynaecological services.
None of the facilities were able to scale up the number of
available patient beds as required. Further, over 36% of
the employees were absent from work for more than a
week either due to their family being affected (65.5%) or
damaged roads (34.5%) during the time of the flood.
Surveillance and Health Information Management
Systems (HIMS)
The Health Information Management System (HIMS)
involves data collection on routine basis from the Primary
Health Centres and Community Health Centres for five
vertical disease control projects along with the Monthly
Information System (MIS). The performance of main-
taining these functions before the disaster was rated as
good (48.3%) and fair (51.7%) respectively. The same was
rated poor by 75.9% facilities during and after the flood.
None of them were able to follow the expected data
reporting standards during the flood period and none of
them received any feedback from the district headquarters
or the state surveillance cell regarding reporting qualityor
status.
All facilities are a mandatory part of the Integrated
Disease Surveillance System and follow standard report-
ing formats. Syndromic surveillance is carried out at the
sub-centres, presumptive at PHCs and CHCs and lab
confirmed (at facilities where labs are available) under
the program for early detection of outbreaks. About
62.1% of the facilities rated their syndromic surveillance
activities after the flood as fair and 34.5% rated it as poor.
Community outreach programs were at a literal halt and
55.2% facilities rated their performance as poor. Labora-
tory services are essential component of disease surveil-
lance for case and outbreak confirmation. These services
were rated as poor by 44.8% of the facilities (Fig. 6).
Essential supplies and emergency stock piles
An overwhelming majority of facilities (21; 72.4%)
reported that they maintain emergency supply stockpiles
of essential medicines. An equal number reported that
they experienced stock outs during the flood days. About
76% of the respondents, who said that their health facility
experienced stock outs, attributed the main reason to a
sudden increase in the number of patients seeking care.
Financial and legal structures
All the health facilities reported that functioning was
hindered due to lack of emergency financial resources
and due to interruption of the routine cash flows.
Officials of these facilities are legally authorized to obtain
and/or seek additional state/national/ international fund-
ing only through the state government which involves
time consuming bureaucratic procedures. It also emerged
that none of the 29 surveyed health facilities waived the
fees for the patients during the flood period.
Governing the response  barriers and facilitators for
mounting an adequate response
The respondents were asked about the factors that
determine their ability to adequately respond to the
flood. Preparing a contingency plan for such a situation
emerged as the most critical factor followed by stocks
reserved for emergency response. This was followed (in
order of importance) by other factors such as provisions
for up scaling in the event of flood, clear orders from
immediate supervisors, more responsive superiors, pre-
sence of relief organizations and access to rapid external
help (Fig. 7).
Fig. 3. Main causes of injuries reported.
Fig. 4. Duration of service disruption.
Prepared to react?
Citation: Glob Health Action 2012, 5: 10964 - DOI: 10.3402/gha.v5i0.10964 5
(page number not for citation purpose)The main factor that negatively influenced the ability
of the facilities to respond adequately was the situation of
chaos that existed during the flood period. Nobody knew
exactly what to do. All facilities functioned as indepen-
dent standalone structures. Lack of clear information
emerged as the second important factor negatively
influencing the performance of the facilities followed by
lack of organization. Other factors included (in order of
importance) lack of skills within the team, lack of
personnel and lack of leadership. The mean numbers of
the responding facilities identifying barriers and facilitat-
ing factors are shown in Fig. 7.
Furthermore, 28 (96.5%) of the facilities reported that
they did not have any emergency preparedness plan in
place and that they do not have any early warning
mechanisms for a flood. When asked about the existence
of specific job descriptions within the organization for
handling floods, an overwhelming 26 (89.7%) of the
facilities replied in the affirmative but none were able to
produce a physical copy of a manual describing standard
operating procedures. When asked about the designated
person responsible for coordinating public health emer-
gency responses at the local level of government, all the
facilities were aware that it was the Chief District Medical
Officer (CDMO).
About 26 (89.7%) of the facilities stated that they were
not enabled with adequate legal authority to develop and/
or implement public health emergency training exercises.
None of them have powers to evacuate a given area,
redirect the distribution of health care supplies, or to
collaborate with other health care providers in the
community and assign them additional responsibilities
for a coordinated response. Institutional learning from
the flood experience was poor and it emerged that there
were no changes or modification in the existing policies
following the flood experiences.
Discussion and recommendations
Data from our primary survey clearly shows that the
healthcare facilities are ill prepared to handle the flood
situation despite being faced by them regularly. Basic
utilities like electricity backup and essential medical
supplies are lacking during floods. Missing standard
operating procedures; human resources; pre-identified
communication systems; incident command systems;
and weak financial structures are the main hindering
factors in mounting an adequate response to the floods.
Service delivery
In our study most facilities routinely over operate to their
capacity and are forced to implement daily surge due to
the lack of resources. Anticipation and preparedness are
keys to planning a response. It is therefore necessary to
understand the patient flow during the disaster to align
the health care service delivery accordingly (9). However,
inadequate documentation during the 2008 flood made
this difficult for us to review, like in several other studies
(25, 26). Although the health conditions remained similar
in our study the frequencies changed before, during and
after the flood. Skin disease was the main health
condition treated before the floods. This is probably
because scabies is a major public health problem and
accounts for the top five disease burden in rural Orissa
(27). Snake bites were the most common injury after the
floods. The essential drug list for the district should
be updated and anti-venom for snake bites should be
Fig. 5. Ratings of health care service performance.
Fig. 6. Performance of the Health Management Information System.
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the delays in transport from the district during floods.
Chikungunya emerged as a new disease in the Jagat-
singhpur district following the 2008 flood. Orissa has
reported emergence of Chikungunya since 2006 particu-
larly in the neighboring districts of Kendrapara and
Cuttuck (28). Appropriate diagnostic tests (serum test for
anti-CHIK antibody (immunoglobulin M)) and treat-
ments along with vector control activities should be
reinstated to prevent disease transmission during the
annual flooding. Chikungunya has now been included in
the Integrated Disease Surveillance System (IDSP) for
routine surveillance which is an important step in its
control (29). However, in the absence of outreach
programs during floods early detection of a developing
outbreak may still be difficult.
Despite most respondents conforming that the every-
day system might have been extended in the post flood
situation, they did not assume a qualitative difference
in the health care services provided during the flood.
In most facilities it was perceived as altered care  in
previously inadequate care  like in other developing
countries (30). Existing guidelines for altered standards
of care in mass casualty events such as the SPHERE
standards should be circulated to the facilities and be
referred to during floods as a first step to investigate the
changes in care provision. The SPHERE standards allow
accountability of care provided to victims in disasters and
maintains minimum acceptable quality of care and serve
as an important reference when formulating preparedness
and response plans (31).
Structural damage to the building and damaged
supplies were reported as the main causes for dysfunction
in our study. The PAHO guidelines for protecting new
health facilities from natural disasters should be referred
to and implemented in the state to prevent structural
damages to new facilities in the future (32). Additionally
essential supplies and important hospital equipments
should be stored in places not prone to flooding (33).
Health services provision is heavily dependent on
preparedness of other supporting sectors such as trans-
port, communication, electricity supplies and water and
sanitation systems (34). All of the facilities reported
dysfunction of one or the other type of supporting system
in our study. None of these were reported to lead to any
public health impacts. However, these dysfunctions
should be nonetheless prevented. It is necessary that
alternate sources for water, electricity, waste disposal
transport, and road communications are identified in the
planning process for the next events (25).
Health workforce
Human resources are a challenge during all disasters and
more pronounced in rural settings (35). The facilities we
Fig. 7. Barriers and facilitating factors identiﬁed for optimal performance during ﬂoods.
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outpatient visitors (with an average of 60 patients per
doctor per day) even in the non-flood periods. This
situation is worsened during floods with additional influx
of those affected. Further, none of the facilities were able
to procure additional staff to deal with the situation.
Given that over 8090% of health care demands in the
first 24 hrs following floods are treatable on ambulatory
basis, augmenting regular staff with trained volunteers
from the community is an option (7, 30, 36, 37).In Orissa,
for example the Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM), Multi-
purpose Health Workers (MPWs) and ASHA (Accre-
dited Social Health Activists) are community health
workforces that are trained in basic public health care
provision. If trained further in mass casualty manage-
ment they can be deployed usefully during floods.
Reduced access to health care facilities due to loss of
vehicles, damaged roads or absent public transportation
are common reasons for staff absenteeism following
several disasters (10). A large number of the employees
were absent from the health centres for more than a week
in our study. Provisions to house available staff and their
families close to the facility while the flood lasts should
be planned through agreements with guest houses or
community homes in the area (14).
Training of staff in management of mass casualty
incidents holds the key to effective and optimum use of
available resources. Lack of trained staff in the backdrop
of ill-equipped health care facilities, poses a special
challenge during floods (38). Practical drills, evidence
based theory sessions, policy analysis activities, and most
essentially regular updating of knowledge should be done
through trainings (39). Experience after each flood
should be used to update individual facility as well as
district and state level preparedness policies. Additionally,
a mere update will not suffice. They need to be heavily
monitored and regularly evaluated for implementation,
alignment to advances in technologies and performance
of identified indicators. A majority of the facilities stated
that they are not enabled with adequate legal authority to
develop and / or implement public health emergency
training exercises. This mandates serious reconsideration.
Information management
Hampered external or internal communications can
potentially threaten disaster response (19). Majority of
the facilities did not report any internal communication
system interruption in our study. Although encouraging,
steps to maintain these conditions and to improve road
access to facilities should be made.
The syndromic surveillance system and the laboratory
reporting systems were weak and limited data was
available during the flood in our study. Health manage-
ment information system procedures went from being
good to poor and did not return to baseline for a
considerable time after the flood (2 months). The
facilities focused on maintaining vertical programmes
and community outreach services were neglected. This
was probably because the reporting schedules for na-
tional vertical programs are stringent; performance
indicators are regularly monitored and result in strict
disciplinary action in case of unsatisfactory performance.
Outreach programs should be maintained during floods
as they aid in reducing the morbidity and mortality from
flood related diseases, help reduce the influx of patients
to the facility, and are essential in developing early
warnings signals for outbreaks (12, 34). Stronger regula-
tory actions are mandated for local outreach programs
like the vertical programs to ensure appropriate function-
ing during floods.
Medical products and supplies
Facilities reported stock-outs for 610 days in our study
mainly due to sudden increase in the number of patients
and disrupted supplies due to damaged roads. This is
attributable to the central procurement policy where
orders for the drugs are placed and payments are made
at the state level, but supplies are delivered at the district
level. Each institution has an pre-agreed entitlement of
drugs and is given a passbook (27). Alternate mechan-
isms for local procurement should be made. Pre-disaster
preferred ‘vendor agreements’ at block levels would be an
effective way to deal with stock outs and delays in
procurement from the district headquarters (11, 14, 16).
Setting up accounts with advance security deposit pay-
ments as assurance should be considered (40). Local
pharmacists associations can also be involved in setting
up these arrangements. Additionally, kits with basic
medical supplies should be developed and maintained
at facility level for initiating a quick response given that
the earliest that outside assistance arrives to the affected
community is pegged at 2496 hrs (7). It is advisable that
the health facilities should be self sufficient at least for
3 days (ideally for a week) and should protect all supplies
from damage until supply resumption (14, 25).
Financing
Optimal functioning of the financial structures during a
flood is necessary to surge capacity and to mount
resources. All facilities reported hindrance in functioning
due to lack of adequate finances and did not have access
to additional resources to deal with the emergency.
Existing resources were clearly inadequate. Additionally,
given the limited resources, the flood non-exposed
community experienced neglect as the focus of interven-
tion, and rightly so, was on the flood exposed commu-
nities. User fees were not waived during the flood even for
the poor, which should be reconsidered. Funding require-
ments for flood response should be calculated on
past experiences and each facility should be granted
Revati Phalkey et al.
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an emergency (14).
Leadership and governance: developing
preparedness plans and preparing to react
During the survey lack of leadership that affected the
decision making process during the flood emerged as the
single significant challenge. In the absence of clear line of
command during disasters even the best resources will fail
to deliver (35). Considerable communication gap existed
between the employees. Absence of proper feedback of
the ground realities to the authorities for a considerable
period of time after the flood was also observed. There
was lack of clear communication from the state level to
district level and from district to the block and health
centre level. All three levels were functioning in an
isolated manner. The medical officers are on a rotation
duty of 2 years and lack the required expertise and
administrative powers to take decisions in flood situation.
They often waited for permissions and instructions from
the higher authorities leading to further uncertainty.
Inter-institutional coordination and cooperation is indis-
pensible in mounting a response to floods and consensus
should be built in this regard (16).
A majority of the respondents considered contingency
plan would help them in confronting this situation.
However, the current plans are just a list of inventory
rather than a plan to meet the issues identified. They even
do not include a list of emergency phone numbers for
reference during the floods which ideally should be
clearly displayed in facilities (25). Few facilities surveyed
had undertaken realistic evaluation of their strengths and
weaknesses for dealing with severe floods despite facing
them regularly. Preparedness plans are unique to a facility
and detailed exercise to identify individual needs should
be undertaken immediately. It is also necessary that all
stakeholders are involved in developing and updating
these plans regularly (16, 17).
Limitations of the study
The study was conducted in one of the 30 districts of the
state and included only public health care facilities.
Although all primary health care centres in the district
were included in the study the limited sample size has
local relevance and limits the generalizability of the study
to the state. Limited documentation during the time of
the flood did not allow detail assessment of morbidity
and mortality data. The grading of performance as good,
poor and fair was left to the interpretation of the
respondents and was therefore subjective. The systems
preparedness for mental health care service provision
could not be assessed as these services are not provided at
the primary health care level. The study included a single
flood incident (September 2008). Given that the district
experiences annual flooding, accumulated impacts need
to be reviewed alongside risk perceptions of the health
care services staff.
Conclusions
The 2008 flood challenged several aspects of the primary
curative and preventive health care services in Jagat-
singhpur, Orissa. The results of this study indicate that
although the facilities stretched their capacities and
pulled through, it may not be pragmatic to continue
doing so every year. Simple steps like developing facility
specific preparedness plans which detail out standard
operating procedures during disasters and identify clear
lines of command will go a long way in strengthening the
response to future floods. De-centralized decision making
infrastructures should be reinstated at the periphery. This
will eliminate the current time spent for acquiring
required clearances from the higher level which delays
responses significantly.
Performance critiques provided by the grass roots
workers like this one should be used for institutional
learning and effective preparedness planning. Most
essentially it is necessary to recognize that having written
disaster plans does not equate to preparedness! Trainings
should be held regularly at all levels. Additionally each
facility should maintain contingency funds for emergency
response along with local vendor agreements to ensure
stock supplies during floods. The facilities should also
ensure that baseline standards for public health care
delivery identified by the Government are met in non-
flood periods in order to improve response during floods.
Building strong public primary health care systems is a
development challenge. The recovery phases of disasters
should be seen as an opportunity to expand and improve
services and facilities.
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